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On May 3, 2011, Governor Nathan Deal signed into law House
Bill 24 (HB 24) bringing a new set of evidence rules to the State of
Georgia.2 The new rules3 will go into effect on January 1, 2013. The
author of this article was the Reporter for the State Bar Evidence
Study Committee when new rules were first proposed back in the
mid-1980s, and again throughout the recent, successful effort to
reform the rules. Part I of this article will give a brief history of the
twenty-six-year effort to bring new evidence rules to Georgia. Part II
will provide a structural overview of the new rules. Part III will then
describe thirty-eight significant changes that judges and trial lawyers
will find in the new rules. Finally, Part IV will mention a few
evidentiary issues that still need attention.

1. Professor of Law and Director of the Litigation Program, Georgia State University, College of
Law. Professor Milich was the Reporter for the State Bar of Georgia Evidence Study Committee that
proposed the new rules of evidence Law. Professor Milich was the Reporter for the State Bar of Georgia
Evidence Study Committee that proposed the new rules of evidence.
2. 2011 Ga. Laws 52 (to be codified in GA. CODE ANN.).
3. For the purposes of this article, “new rules” refers to the rule that will go into effect January 1,
2013. “Current rules” refers to the rules in effect prior to January 1, 2013.
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I. A BRIEF HISTORY – A LONG AND WINDING ROAD
Georgia’s current rules of evidence are mostly contained in Title
24, and most of Title 24 is based on the Code of 1863. In 1858, the
Georgia Legislature appointed three commissioners, Richard Clark,
Thomas R. Cobb, and David Irwin, to prepare a code which should
“as near as practicable, embrace in a condensed form, the laws of
Georgia,” including the common law and principles of equity then
recognized by the courts of this state.4 It was a massive task for the
commissioners, and they were given less than two years to finish it.
To Judge Irwin fell the task of preparing the Code of Practice, which
included civil procedure, equity practice, and rules of evidence. The
work was completed in 1860 and adopted by the legislature with only
a few minor changes in December of that year. Due to the war,
publication was delayed until 1863, and thus, the code has been
referred to ever since as the Code of 1863.
Although a few rules were added or changed over the years, the
core of Title 24 remains a product of nineteenth century views on
trial procedure. To state that these antiquated rules poorly address the
needs and realities of twenty-first century courtrooms is an
understatement.5 In 1975, Congress passed the Federal Rules of
Evidence and this inspired many states to modernize their own rules.
By 1985, more than thirty states had adopted new rules of evidence
based on the Federal Rules.6
In 1985, the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia
“approved in principle” a proposal to study whether Georgia should
adopt new rules of evidence based more or less on the Federal Rules
of Evidence. In 1986, Robert Brinson, the president of the State Bar,
4. Richard H. Clark, The History of the First Georgia Code, in REPORT OF THE SEVENTH ANNUAL
MEETING OF THE GEORGIA BAR ASSOCIATION, 144 (1890).
5. See PAUL S. MILICH, GEORGIA RULES OF EVIDENCE § 1.1, at 1–3 (2011–2012 ed. 2011).
6. That number has since grown. Georgia is the forty-fourth state to adopt new rules based on the
Federal Rules of Evidence. 6 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL
EVIDENCE ch. T, notes (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2011) (listing forty-two of the states). The
forty-third state, Illinois, adopted new rules in late 2010. See Chris Bonjean, Supreme Court Approves
Illinois Rules of Evidence, ILL. ST. B. ASS’N (Sept. 27, 2010), http://iln.isba.org/2010/09/27/supremecourt-approves-illinois-rules-of-evidence.
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appointed Frank C. Jones chairman of the Evidence Study
Committee. The committee’s mission was to explore reform of
Georgia’s old evidence code. The committee undertook an intensive
review of the differences between the Federal Rules and Georgia’s
rules.
In 1987, the General Assembly adopted a joint resolution
encouraging the study of Georgia’s evidence rules. In 1988, the State
Bar Evidence Study Committee completed its report to the Bar with a
full draft of the proposed new rules. The Board of Governors
approved the new rules and they were introduced, with the State
Bar’s support, in the 1989 legislative session.
The proposed new rules were warmly received in the Senate where
then-Senator Nathan Deal sponsored them. They passed the Senate
twice, unanimously in 1990, but with a few negative votes in 1991.
The reception in the House, however, was less warm. Speaker Tom
Murphy, a trial lawyer, was initially ambivalent about adopting new
evidence rules. With his characteristic humor, he told this author that
he was an old dinosaur and that old dinosaurs don’t like to learn new
tricks. After numerous efforts to convince him that the new rules
were right for Georgia, the Speaker told Chairman Jones and this
author, “Georgia will someday have new rules of evidence—just not
while I am Speaker.” The proposed new rules of evidence were never
scheduled for a vote in the House Judiciary Committee.
Taking the Speaker at his word, the State Bar backed off the
project until 2002 when Speaker Murphy was defeated in his bid for
reelection. State Bar President Bill Barwick reactivated the Evidence
Study Committee in 2003 with Ray Persons as chair and Thomas M.
Byrne as vice chair.7 The committee produced a detailed analysis and
draft of the proposed new rules in 2005, but progress on the political
front faltered as the Bar received mixed messages from key
legislators as to their appetite for undertaking evidence reform.
In 2008, the State Bar Board of Governors approved the new rules.
The Chair of the House Judiciary Committee, Wendell Willard,
welcomed the proposal to advance new rules with one important
7. Thomas Byrne eventually succeeded Ray Persons as chair in 2009.
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proviso: the new rules could not attempt to alter any of the policies
that were part of the 2005 tort reform efforts. A few parts of the State
Bar’s proposal that addressed areas affected by the 2005 tort reform
were withdrawn.8
In the summer of 2008, a Joint House and Senate Legislative
Study Committee, chaired by Representative Wendell Willard and
assisted by members of the State Bar Evidence Study Committee,
met in fourteen sessions that undertook a line-by-line examination of
the proposed rules. These sessions were open to the public and
included input from a wide variety of legal and nonlegal
organizations. This exhaustive review resulted in House Bill 24 (HB
24), introduced in the 2009 session.
It is difficult to get trial lawyers from so many different interest
groups to agree on a wide-ranging set of evidence rules. One of the
great advantages of a unified state bar is its ability to bring together
all of these varied, and at times antagonistic, interests into
constructive dialog. Personal injury lawyers argue with insurance
defense lawyers; creditors’ rights advocates fence with debtors’
rights attorneys; prosecutors duel with criminal defense lawyers; and
so on. The evidence proposal exposed generational differences as
well. Some older trial lawyers, particularly those who practice rarely,
if at all, in federal courts, naturally were not thrilled at the prospect of
having to learn new evidence rules. Most younger litigators, on the
other hand, were taught the Federal Rules in law school and were
impatient for Georgia to adopt the new rules. Almost all of these
differences were ironed out in the slow and steady course of
negotiations, education, and compromise. But in 2009, it was
apparent that one group was not yet convinced—Georgia
prosecutors.

8. The State Bar’s proposal would have provided some procedural guidance for the handling of
Daubert motions and would have extended Daubert to criminal, as well as civil cases. See EVIDENCE
STUDY COMM., STATE BAR OF GA., PROPOSED NEW RULES OF EVIDENCE 76–80 (2005), available at
http://www.gabar.org/public/pdf/news/proposed_new_evidence_rules.pdf
[hereinafter
EVIDENCE
STUDY]. The State Bar proposal also would have amended the “medical apology” statute, GA. CODE
ANN. § 24-3-37.1(c) (2010), to delete the exclusion of a defendant’s admission of “mistake” or “error.”
Id.at 49–50.
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Of all the trial lawyers in Georgia, prosecutors have the least
experience in federal courtrooms. For many prosecutors, particularly
the more senior ones, the Federal Rules of Evidence represented
unknown territory. It took the patient efforts of a handful of highly
respected, forward-looking prosecutors to convince their brothers and
sisters that there was more to like than to dislike, more to embrace
than to fear, in the proposed new rules. After further negotiations and
some amendments to the proposal, the prosecutors withdrew their
opposition to the new rules in March of 2010. HB 24 passed the
House by a vote of 150–12. Time ran out in the Senate, however, as
HB 24 was voted favorably out of the Senate Judiciary Committee
but died in the Rules Committee.
As the 2011 session began, it appeared that the stars were finally
aligned in favor of passing the new Georgia Rules of Evidence. All
organized opposition was gone. Speaker David Ralston, one of the
original sponsors of HB 24, was supportive. The new Chair of the
Senate Judiciary Committee, Bill Hamrick, also was supportive. The
new Governor, Nathan Deal, had supported the evidence reform
when he was a senator more than twenty years earlier and reaffirmed
his support for the latest effort. The Council of Superior Court Judges
came out in favor of the bill and the State Bar was pushing harder
than ever to get the bill passed. On February 28, 2011, the House
voted 162–5 in favor of HB 24. The Senate passed the bill on the last
day of the session, by a vote of 50–3.
One of the fears going into the legislative process was that the
Bar’s proposal would be carved up by amendments and distorted into
something worse than no new rules at all. Thanks mainly to the
resolute efforts of House Judiciary Committee Chairman Wendell
Willard, this did not happen. Although there were compromises
along the way, the core integrity of the rules—as proposed by the
State Bar—remained.9

9. For more information regarding the history behind the Georgia Evidence Code, see generally
MILICH, supra note 5, § 1:1.
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II. A STRUCTURAL OVERVIEW OF THE NEW EVIDENCE CODE
Current Title 24 is completely replaced by the new rules. Many
stray evidence provisions from other titles of the Georgia Code have
been moved into the new Title 24, others have been stricken. So the
first benefit of the new Code is accessibility—nearly all pertinent
evidence rules are now contained in the new Title 24.
The new rules are based on the Federal Rules of Evidence with a
few changes to address known problems with the current Federal
Rules10 or to retain particularly desirable Georgia policies. For
example, the wide-open cross-examination rule is retained,11 as is the
Gibbons rule that makes all prior inconsistent statements of testifying
witnesses admissible as substantive evidence.12
The numbering of the new rules is based on the Federal Rules. The
new citation will first identify the Georgia Title (24), then the Federal
Rule of Evidence Article (e.g., 8 for Hearsay), and then the Federal
Rule number. For example, the new cite to Georgia’s business record
exception is 24-8-803(6). The new cite to Georgia’s rule on
impeachment by prior conviction is 24-6-609.
Section I of HB 24 states:
It is the intent of the General Assembly in enacting this Act to
adopt the Federal Rules of Evidence, as interpreted by the
Supreme Court of the United States and the United States circuit
courts of appeal as of January 1, 2013, to the extent that such
interpretation is consistent with the Constitution of Georgia.
Where conflicts were found to exist among the decisions of the
various circuit courts of appeal interpreting the federal rules of
evidence, the General Assembly considered the decisions of the
13
11th Circuit Court of Appeals. It is the intent of the General

10. See discussion infra Part III.
11. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-6-611(b) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
12. Gibbons v. State, 286 S.E.2d 717 (Ga. 1982).
13. The legislators were mindful that they could not dictate the legal sources that courts must use in
interpreting and applying the rules of evidence because of the separation of powers issues that such a
dictation would entail. See Mason v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 658 S.E.2d 603, 608–10 (Ga. 2008).
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Assembly to revise, modernize, and reenact the general laws of
this state relating to evidence while adopting, in large measure,
the Federal Rules of Evidence. The General Assembly is
cognizant that there are many issues regarding evidence that are
not covered by the Federal Rules of Evidence and in those
situations the former provisions of Title 24 have been retained.
Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the
General Assembly intends that the substantive law of evidence in
14
Georgia as it existed on December 31, 2012, be retained.

Among the Georgia rules of evidence that are not
significantly changed by HB 24 are the following:
— Evidentiary Privileges (Attorney-Client, PsychotherapistPatient, Accountant Client, Both Marital Privileges, News
Gatherer Privilege, Clergy Privilege, Informant Privilege, SelfIncrimination Privileges, Medical Records and Confidences
Protections, Work Product Protections)15
— Evidentiary Presumptions in Civil and Criminal Cases16
— Rape Victim Shield Statute17
— Admission of Accused’s Prior Similar Sex Offenses in Sex
Crime Cases18
— Child Competency to Testify in Abuse Cases19
— Admission of a Child’s Statements Reporting Abuse20
— Admission of Subsequent Remedial Measures in Product
Liability Cases21
— Inadmissibility of Liability Insurance, Collateral Benefits22
— “Apology Statute” in Medical Malpractice Cases23
14. H.R.
24,
151st
Gen.
Assemb.,
Reg.
Sess.
(Ga.
2009),
available
at
http://www1.legis.ga.gov/legis/2011_12/fulltext/hb24.htmhttp://www1.legis.ga.gov/legis/2011_12/fullte
xt/hb24.htm.
15. See MILICH, supra note 5, Part 6: Evidentiary Privileges.
16. See id, pt. 5.
17. See id, § 11:6.
18. See id, § 11:13.
19. See id, § 12:2.
20. See id, § 19:31.
21. See MILICH, supra note 5, § 18:6.
22. See id, § 9:3.
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— Daubert Applies in Civil Cases but Not Criminal Cases24
— Judicial Notice25
— Sequestration of Witnesses26
— Lay Opinion Rules27
— Rules for Proving Value28
— Rule of Completeness29
— Continuing Witness Rule30
— Wide Open Cross-Examination Rule31
— Character Rule in Civil Cases32
— Rules Regarding Demonstrative Evidence33
— Proving Chain of Custody34
— Rules Regarding Use of Polygraph Evidence35
— Rules Regarding Use of Hypnotically Refreshed
Recollections36
— Rules Regarding Out-of-Court Identifications of the Accused37
— Impeachment by Prior Conviction38
— Distinction Between Offers of Direct and Collateral Benefits in
Evaluating
Confessions39
— “Silent Witness” Rule (Admissibility of Automated Video
Recordings)40
— Basic Definition of Hearsay41
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

See id, § 18:7.
See id, § 15:9.
See id, § 4:2.
See id, § 13:6.
See MILICH, supra note 5, § 15:2.
See id, § 15:11.
See id, §§ 6:3, 19:8.
See id, § 19:8.
See id, § 13:3.
See id, § 11:9.
See MILICH, supra note 5, §§ 10:1–4.
See id, § 7:1.
See id, § 15:10.
See id, § 12:6.
See id, § 17:8.
See id, § 14:4.
See MILICH, supra note 5, § 18:8.
See id, § 7:3.
See id, § 16:5.
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— Rules Regarding Use of Prior Consistent Statements42
— Personal Admission Rule43
— Hearsay Exceptions for Past Recollection Recorded, Statements
for Medical Diagnosis or Treatment, Medical Narratives, Reputation
Evidence, Former Testimony, Deposition Testimony, Dying
Declarations, Necessity Exception (though pre-trial notice
required).44
III. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THIRTY-EIGHT SIGNIFICANT CHANGES
WROUGHT BY THE NEW RULES
The following overview is organized in three sections: General
Rules Applying to Both Civil and Criminal Trials, Rules Relating
Only to Criminal Trials, and Rules Relating Only to Civil Trials.
(A)

General Rules Applying to Both Civil and Criminal Trials

(1) Specific Directions for Making Evidence Rulings—There
currently are no Georgia statutes that spell out how the trial court is
to approach evidence issues. While most judges have little problem
navigating such issues in most cases, the addition of uniform, specific
directions makes it easier for both lawyers and judges to work
through preliminary matters.
New sections 24-1-104(a) and (b) clarify the roles of the judge and
the jury in preliminary questions of fact. Currently, Georgia juries are
instructed to determine whether evidence is admissible under a host
of situations.45 The new rules assign these decisions, with few
exceptions, solely to the trial judge.46 The judge may consider any
non-privileged evidence in making these preliminary determinations
and the court uses a preponderance of the evidence standard in
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

See id, § 17:15.
See id, § 18:3.
See id, ch. 19.
See MILICH, supra note 5, § 3.7.
Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a
privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to the
provisions of subsection (b) of this Code section.
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-1-104(a) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
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considering whether the preliminary facts have been proven.47 For
example, before admitting a document under the business record
exception, the judge must determine whether the record was made in
the ordinary course of business. The judge may consider any nonprivileged evidence, including hearsay, in making this determination
and decide whether the proponent has shown, by a preponderance of
the evidence that the record was made in the ordinary course of
business.
When the evidence rule in question is not technical in nature (like
the business record exception) but goes to the relevance of the
underlying evidence, the trial judge takes a different approach that
preserves the ultimate issue for the jury. For example, if the
substance seized from the defendant is not in fact cocaine, it is
irrelevant in a trial for possession of that illegal drug. Where the
relevance of evidence depends upon a preliminary question of fact,
the judge must admit the evidence if a reasonable jury could find that
the preliminary fact is proven.48 In making this determination, the
judge considers only such evidence as the jury will hear at the trial.
(2) Broader Application of “Plain Error” Review—Currently,
“plain error” review is limited in Georgia to capital cases and
allegations that the trial judge improperly commented on the
evidence in a jury trial,49 though some court of appeals panels have
applied it more broadly.50 The new rules codify the basic requirement
that a party must object to a trial court ruling in order to preserve
47. In making its determination, the court shall not be bound by the rules of evidence except those
with respect to privileges. Preliminary questions shall be resolved by a preponderance of the
evidence standard.
Id. This last sentence of subsection (a) was added to the language of the Federal Rule in order to clarify
what federal case law has confirmed: the court should use a preponderance of the evidence standard in
deciding preliminary questions. See, e.g., Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175–76 (1987).
48. When the relevancy of evidence depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court
shall admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding of
the fulfillment of the condition.
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-1-104(b) (effective Jan. 1, 2013). This is consistent with current Georgia law
which views most authentication issues as jury issues and the judge should admit the evidence for jury
consideration if it is legally sufficient to support a jury finding that it is what the proponent claims it to
be. See Jones v. State, 401 S.E.2d 322, 323 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991).
49. Paul v. State, 537 S.E.2d 58, 61 (Ga. 2000).
50. See, e.g., In re M.F., 623 S.E.2d 235, 236 (2005). But see Delgado v. State, 651 S.E.2d 201, 206
(Ga. Ct. App. 2007) (deferring to Supreme Court’s limitation on plain error review).
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error,51 but clarifies that this does not prevent the appellate courts
from considering plain error in all instances.52 The standard for what
constitutes plain error was not changed. Georgia courts have defined
it as error “so clearly erroneous as to result in a likelihood of a grave
miscarriage of justice or which seriously affects the fairness, integrity
or public reputation of a judicial proceeding.”53
(3) Clarifies the “Balancing Test”—Although Georgia courts
have recognized the power of a trial judge to exclude relevant
evidence when its probative value is outweighed by unfair prejudicial
effects, our courts have described the balancing test inconsistently.
Some cases state that the court may exclude the evidence only if the
unfair prejudicial effects “substantially outweigh” the probative
value, while many other cases do not include the word
“substantially” and permit exclusion if the prejudice simply
outweighs the probative value of the evidence.54 The new rules adopt
the language of Federal Rule 403 that the prejudicial effects must
substantially outweigh the probative value.55
(4) Definition of Hearsay—Georgia’s current definition of
hearsay56 and the federal definition57 (adopted by the new rules)
51. Error shall not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a
substantial right of the party is affected and:
(1) In case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely objection or motion to strike
appears of record, stating the specific ground of objection, if the specific ground was not
apparent from the context; or
(2) In case the ruling is one excluding evidence, the substance of the evidence was made
known to the court by an offer of proof or was apparent from the context within which questions
were asked.
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-1-103(a) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
52. Nothing in this Code section shall preclude a court from taking notice of plain errors affecting
substantial rights although such errors were not brought to the attention of the court.
Id. § 24-1-103(d).
53. Thorne v. State, 542 S.E.2d 157, 159 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (citation omitted); see United States v.
Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291, 1298–99 (11th Cir. 2005).
54. See MILICH, supra note 5, § 6.4, at 110 n.1 (citing cases).
55. Relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury or by considerations of
undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-4-403 (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
56. Hearsay evidence is that which does not derive its value solely from the credit of the witness but
rests mainly on the veracity and competency of other persons.
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-3-1 (2010).
57. Compare FED. R. EVID. 801(c) (“‘Hearsay’ is a statement, other than one made by the declarant
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serve much the same function. The main difference is that Georgia’s
current definition does not include the out-of-court statements of a
testifying witness.58 This makes more sense than the federal
approach. The primary problem with hearsay is the inability to crossexamine the hearsay declarant, to raise questions that could help the
trier of fact determine if the declarant was lying or mistaken when the
statement was made.59 If the hearsay declarant is on the stand and
available for cross-examination, these problems are not present and
the witness’s prior out-of-court statements should be admissible if
they are relevant and not merely cumulative of the witness’s in-court
testimony. Such statements are relevant when they are prior
inconsistent statements of the witness or prior consistent statements
that rebut an attack on the witness’s credibility.60
Georgia’s new rules retain Georgia’s current approach to a
testifying witness’s prior out-of-court statements. Such statements are
not hearsay.61 Normally, such statements are inadmissible, not
because they are hearsay, but because they are cumulative and
improper bolstering of the witness’s in-court testimony.62 If the
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”),
with GA. CODE ANN. § 24-8-801(c) (effective Jan. 1, 2013) (“‘Hearsay’ means a statement, other than
one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth
of the matter asserted.”).
58. See, e.g., Carroll v. State, 408 S.E.2d 412, 413 (Ga. 1991) (“In Cuzzort, we held that the
concerns of the rule against hearsay are satisfied where the witness whose veracity is at issue is present
at trial, under oath, and subject to cross-examination.”). In Bowers v. State, a defendant claimed that the
witness’s testimony about her own prior out-of-court statements was hearsay and the court disagreed,
stating: “Hearsay evidence is that which does not derive its value solely from the credit of the witness
but rests mainly on the veracity and competency of other persons. Here, the witness was the
declarant. . . . Her statements were not dependent upon the competency and veracity of other persons.”).
Bowers v. State, 526 S.E.2d 163, 166 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
59. See MILICH, supra note 5, § 16.4.
60. See MILICH, supra note 5, §§ 16.5, 17.14, 17.16.
61. An out-of-court statement shall not be hearsay if the declarant testifies at the trial or hearing, is
subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is admissible as a prior
inconsistent statement or a prior consistent statement under Code Section 24-6-613 or is
otherwise admissible under this chapter.
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-8-801(d)(1)(A) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
62. See Parker v. State, 290 S.E.2d 518, 521 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982). (“In Georgia, as well as most other
jurisdictions, the general rule is that a witness’ testimony cannot be fortified or corroborated by his own
prior consistent statements. . . . ‘It can scarcely be satisfactory to any mind to say that, if a witness
testifies to a statement today under oath, it strengthens the statement to prove that he said the same thing
yesterday when not under oath. . . [.] The idea that the mere repetition of a story gives it any force or
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witness’s prior out-of-court statements are admissible as prior
inconsistent statements to impeach him or as prior consistent
statements to rehabilitate his credibility after attack, then they are
admissible on that basis without regard to the hearsay rule.
(5) Self-Serving Statement Rule Retired—Under current Georgia
law, an out-of-court statement is inadmissible if deemed “selfserving,” that is, if the statement is “of benefit to or in the interest of
the one who made it . . . and does not include testimony which he
gives as a witness.”63 This is a rather antiquated rule that originated
at a time when parties were deemed incompetent to testify. This rule
prevented them from circumventing that incompetency by having
witnesses offer the parties’ out-of-court, self-serving statements.64
Since it really is nothing more than an application of the hearsay rule,
it is no longer needed.65
(6) Hearsay No Longer “Illegal” Evidence—Under current
Georgia law, hearsay is “illegal” evidence without probative value,
and even if admitted without objection, cannot sustain a finding or
verdict.66 Georgia is the only jurisdiction in the United States that
still deems hearsay illegal evidence.67 The rule is little more than a
trap for the unwary and an incentive to sandbag.68 The new rules
specifically state: “Hearsay shall not be admissible except as
provided by this article; provided, however, that if a party does not
properly object to hearsay, the objection shall be deemed waived, and
the hearsay evidence shall be legal evidence and admissible.”69
proves its truth is contrary to common observation and experience that a falsehood may be repeated as
often as the truth.’” (quoting 4 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1124,
at 258 (James H. Chadbourn ed., 1976))); see also Boyt v. State, 649 S.E.2d 589, 592 (Ga. Ct. App.
2007).
63. Ga. Ports Auth. v. Mitsubishi Int’l Corp., 274 S.E.2d 699, 702 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980).
64. See 1 GEORGE E. DIX ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 270 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 6th ed.
2006) [hereinafter MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE].
65. Chrysler Motor Corp. v. Davis, 173 S.E.2d 691, 693 (Ga. 1982).
66. See Woodruff v. Woodruff, 531 S.E.2d 714, 716 (Ga. 2000); Cabrera v. State, 694 S.E.2d 720,
723–24 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010).
67. See MILICH, supra note 5, § 16.7.
68. See, e.g., Patterson v. State, 650 S.E.2d 770, 774 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007); Anton Int’l Corp. v.
Williams-Russell & Johnson, Inc., 377 S.E.2d 688, 689 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989); see also Roebuck v. State,
586 S.E.2d 651, 659, 660 (Ga. 2003) (Fletcher, C.J., concurring) (“[W]e should overrule our prior cases
holding that hearsay has no probative value even when admitted without objection.”).
69. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-8-802 (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
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(7) The Term “Original Evidence” Retired—Georgia’s
nineteenth century evidence statutes use the term “original evidence”
to refer to out-of-court statements that are offered for a nonhearsay
purpose.70 Although current Georgia law is logically consistent with
the federal definition of hearsay and the distinction between the
hearsay and nonhearsay use of out-of-court statements, Georgia has
struggled with some of the arcane terminology in this area.71
Adopting the federal definition of hearsay introduces a more modern
and descriptive vocabulary for distinguishing hearsay from
nonhearsay. Such widely used and familiar terms as “effect on
hearer” and “verbal act” replace “original evidence.” In the end, the
goal is the same under the old and new rules: To distinguish the use
of statements that depend upon the credibility of the out-of-court
declarant (hearsay) from statements that are relevant for the mere fact
that they were said (nonhearsay).
(8) Res Gestae Retired—The much-maligned doctrine of “res
gestae” is finally put to rest.72 As Professor Morgan wrote nearly a
hundred years ago: “The marvelous capacity of a Latin phrase to
serve as a substitute for reasoning, and the confusion of thought
inevitably accompanying the use of inaccurate terminology, are no
where better illustrated than in the decisions dealing with the
admissibility of evidence as ‘res gestae.’”73
As a hearsay exception, the problem with res gestae is its
vagueness, its lack of direction. Too often, the term is invoked more
as a “shibboleth” than as a product of analysis or reasoning.74 As one
70. When, in a legal investigation, information, conversations, letters and replies, and similar
evidence are facts to explain conduct and ascertain motives, they shall be admitted in evidence
not as hearsay but as original evidence.
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-3-2 (2010).
71. See, e.g., White Missionary Baptist Church v. Trustees of First Baptist Church of White, 492
S.E.2d 661, 669 (Ga, 1997); Teague v. State, 314 S.E.2d 910, 910–12 (Ga. 1984); see also MILICH,
supra note 5, §§ 17.1–.6.
72. Declarations accompanying an act, or so nearly connected therewith in time as to be free from all
suspicion of device or afterthought, shall be admissible in evidence as part of the res gestae.
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-3-3 (2010).
73. Edmund M. Morgan, A Suggested Classification of Utterances Admissible as Res Gestae, 31
YALE L.J. 229, 229 (1922).
74. See 6 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1745, at 191–92 (James
H. Chadbourn ed., 1976) (“There has been such a confounding of ideas, and such a profuse and
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prominent Georgia trial lawyer explained to me years ago: “Res
gestae is very simple. If the judge likes you, it gets in. If the judge
doesn’t like you, it doesn’t get in.”
The new rules replace res gestae with three descriptive hearsay
exceptions that have worked well in federal and state courts for the
past thirty-plus years: 803(1), (2), and (3).
Subsection (1) admits statements that are contemporaneous, or
nearly so, with the declarant’s perception of the events or conditions
described.75 Subsection (2), the excited utterance exception, admits
statements “relating to a startling event or condition made while the
declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or
condition.”76
Subsection (3) admits statements of the declarant’s then-existing
mental, emotional, or physical condition when relevant to some issue
in the case.77 Statements of a declarant’s belief or memory are not
admissible if offered to prove the truth of the matter believed or
remembered. Thus, the out-of-court statement, “I believe Joe killed
Sally,” is just as inadmissible as the statement, “Joe killed Sally,”
when offered to prove the truth of the matter believed or asserted.78
Subsection (3) also admits a declarant’s statement of intent or plan
regarding his future conduct as circumstantial evidence that the
declarant carried out that intent. Thus, the statement, “I plan to go to
Savannah tonight,” is admissible. But if the statement is, “I plan to go
to Savannah tonight with Sally,” the statement is both a statement of
indiscriminate use of the shibboleth res gestae, that it is difficult to disentangle the real basis of the
principle involved.”).
75. A statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was
perceiving the event or condition or immediately thereafter.
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-8-803(1) (effective Jan. 1, 2013); e.g., Miller v. Crown Amusements, Inc., 821 F.
Supp. 703 (S.D. Ga. 1993).
76. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-8-803(2) (effective Jan. 1, 2013); e.g., United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d
783, 817 (11th Cir. 2010).
77. A statement of the declarant’s then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical
condition, such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health, but not
including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless such
statements relate to the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of the declarant’s will and
not including a statement of belief as to the intent of another person.
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-8-803(3) (effective Jan. 1, 2013); e.g., United States v. Samaniego, 345 F.3d 1280,
1282 (11th Cir. 2003).
78. § 24-8-803(3); e.g., Samaniego, 345 F.3d at 1282.
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the declarant’s then-existing intent and of the declarant’s belief as to
the intent of another person. This is the so-called Hillmon problem
based on the 1892 United States Supreme Court case, Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. Hillmon, where the declarant’s statement that he
intended to travel to Colorado with Hillmon was admitted.79 The
result in Hillmon has been criticized,80 and Georgia courts have not
allowed a declarant’s statement of belief as to the intent of another.81
The new rules retain current Georgia policy and expressly limit
statements of intent to the declarant’s own intent and not that of third
persons.82
(9) Business Record Exception Allows Opinions—Under
Georgia’s current business record exception, “conclusions, opinions,
estimates, and impressions of third parties not before the court” are
inadmissible.83 The new rules reject these limitations,84 though lay or
expert opinions in the record still require qualification under the
opinion rules.85
(10) Business Record Exception Foundation by Affidavit—Current
Georgia law requires a “qualified witness” to appear at trial and lay

79. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285, 299–300 (1892).
80. See, e.g., Paul S. Milich, Hearsay Antinomies: The Case for Abolishing the Rule and Starting
Over, 71 OR. L. REV. 723 (1992).
81. See, e.g., Mallory v. State, 409 S.E.2d 839, 841 (Ga. 1991) (finding declarant’s statement that
she intended to meet the defendant later for coffee was inadmissible to prove that the two probably met
for coffee); see also H.R. REP. NO. 93-650, at 13–14 (1st Sess. 1973) (“[T]he Committee intends that the
Rule be construed to limit the doctrine of Mutual Life Ins Co. v. Hillmon, so as to render statements of
intent by a declarant admissible only to prove his future conduct, not the future conduct of another
person.”(citation omitted)).
82. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-8-803(3) (does not include “a statement of belief as to the intent of another
person”).
83. Turner v. State, 541 S.E.2d 641, 645 n.2 (Ga. 2001) (citing Duncan v. State, 515 S.E.2d 388 (Ga.
1999)).
84. Records of regularly conducted activity. Unless the source of information or the method or
circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness and subject to the provisions of
Chapter 7 of this title, a memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts,
events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, if (A) made at or near the time of the described acts,
events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses; (B) made by, or from information transmitted by, a
person with personal knowledge and a business duty to report; (C) kept in the course of a
regularly conducted business activity; and (D) it was the regular practice of that business activity
to make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation . . . .
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-8-803(6) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
85. Id.; see id. § 24-7-701 (lay opinions); id. § 24-7-702 (expert opinions).
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the requisite foundation for a business record.86 The new rules offer
an additional option.87 A party can acquire a certification from the
custodian or other person qualified to lay foundation for the record
under the business record exception. The party must give all
opposing parties advanced written notice of its intent to use the
certification in lieu of live testimony and make the record available
for inspection prior to trial.88
This certification procedure is available in criminal cases for
domestic records though nothing in the new rules changes any
Confrontation Clause issues that might affect, in certain cases, the
prosecution’s offer of records without the testimony of a live
witness.89
(11) Business Record Exception—”Integrated Records Rule”—
Georgia courts have struggled under the current business record
statute with the problem of one business laying foundation for
records received from a different business. The cases are inconsistent
and have permitted, in some cases, a witness to “lay foundation” for a
business record without any evidence that the witness has a clue as to
how the record was produced.90

86. See MILICH, supra note 5, § 19:15.
87. See GA. CODE ANN. § 24-8-803(6).
88. Extrinsic evidence of authenticity as a condition precedent to admissibility shall not be required
with respect to the following: . . .
(11) The original or a duplicate of a domestic record of regularly conducted activity that would
be admissible under paragraph (6) of Code Section 24-8-803 if accompanied by a written
declaration of its custodian or other qualified person certifying that the record:
(A) Was made at or near the time of the occurrence of the matters set forth by, or from
information transmitted by, a person with knowledge of such matters;
(B) Was kept in the course of the regularly conducted activity; and
(C) Was made by the regularly conducted activity as a regular practice.
A party intending to offer a record into evidence under this paragraph shall provide written
notice of such intention to all adverse parties and shall make the record and declaration available
for inspection sufficiently in advance of their offer into evidence to provide an adverse party
with a fair opportunity to challenge such record and declaration.
Id. § 24-9-902. New Code section 24-9-902(12) is to the same effect regarding foreign records though it
applies only in civil cases.
89. See generally Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009) (offering of records
without live testimony).
90. See, e.g., Walter R. Thomas Assoc., Inc. v. Media Dynamite, Inc., 643 S.E.2d 883, 886 (Ga.
2007); see also MILICH, supra note 5, § 19.15.
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The new business record exception is based on the Federal Rule
and takes advantage of the “integrated records rule” as developed by
federal courts to address this problem. The basic requirements for the
integrated records rule are (1) a business relationship between the
business that initially made the record and the one who received it,
(2) the recipient business routinely relies upon the accuracy of the
record and integrates it into its own files, (3) the recipient business
has a witness who is sufficiently familiar with how the originating
business routinely prepared the record to establish that the record was
made and kept in the ordinary course of business at or near the time
of the events described in the record, and (4) circumstances support
the trustworthiness of the record.91
(12) Public Records Hearsay Exception—Under current Georgia
law, public records offered to prove the truth of the matters asserted
in the records92 are often admitted under the general business record
exception or one of the dozens of specific Georgia statutes relating to
the admissibility of records of a particular agency or office. 93 The
new rules provide a set of generic provisions governing the
admission of public records,94 though these are still subject to
specific statutes. Thus, for example, accident reports filed with the
Department of Motor Vehicle Safety would continue to be
inadmissible under current Georgia Code Section 40-9-41.
There are three generic categories of public records under the new
rules.95 The first, activities of the office or agency itself, is admissible
without restriction in civil and criminal cases.
91. See Air Land Forwarders, Inc. v. United States, 172 F.3d 1338, 1342–45 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see
also Kolmes v. World Fibers Corp., 107 F.3d 1534, 1542–43 (Fed. Cir. 1997); United States v. BuenoSierra, 99 F.3d 375, 379 (11th Cir. 1996); NLRB v. First Termite Control Co., 646 F.2d 424, 427 (9th
Cir. 1981).
92. The very existence of certain documents, such as deeds or licenses, has a legal effect apart from
any hearsay use. A deed, for example, is not “true or false,” but “valid or invalid.” When a public record
is offered only for its legal effect, it is not hearsay and requires no exception. See MILICH, supra note 5,
§ 19.15, at 693 n.19.
93. Id. § 19.19.
94. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-8-803(8) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
95. Public records and reports. Except as otherwise provided by law, public records, reports,
statements, or data compilations, in any form, of public offices, setting forth:
(A) The activities of the public office;
(B) Matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty
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The second category, matters observed pursuant to duty
(subsection (B)), is unavailable to the prosecution in a criminal case
when the author or sources of the information are law enforcement
acting in an investigative capacity. When a law enforcement official
prepares a report as a mundane, ministerial function, and not in the
course of an investigation, the report is admissible in a criminal case.
Thus, for example, an intoxilyzer inspection certification is
admissible without the testimony of the inspector under this
exception,96 and this is consistent with current law.97
The third category, investigative reports (subsection (C)), is
completely unavailable to the prosecution in a criminal case. For
example, a drug analysis report is inadmissible in a criminal trial
without the testimony of someone from the drug lab.98 Of course, if
the author of or sources in the report testify at trial, the report may be
used, with proper foundation, to refresh recollection99 or as past
recollections recorded.100
“Factual findings,” in subsection (C), is broader than “matters
observed,” in subsection (B), in that it implies that the preparer of the
report relies on sources of information other than his own personal
knowledge. In this respect, subsection (C) may admit what otherwise
might constitute multiple hearsay. It also may include opinions.101
However, factual findings should not extend to include legal
conclusions of the preparer.102 As with business records,103 if the
to report, excluding, however, against the accused in criminal proceedings, matters observed by
police officers and other law enforcement personnel in connection with an investigation; or
(C) In civil proceedings and against the state in criminal proceedings, factual findings
resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law, unless the sources of
information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.
Id.
96. E.g., Commonwealth v. Roberts, 122 S.W.3d 524, 528–29 (Ky. 2003); State v. Smith, 675 P.2d
510, 512 (Or. Ct. App. 1984); State v. Dilliner, 569 S.E.2d 211, 215 (W. Va. 2002).
97. See Rackoff v. State, 637 S.E.2d 706, 709 (Ga. 2006); Ritter v. State, 703 S.E.2d 8, 10 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2010).
98. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2540 (2009); Herrera v. State, 702 S.E.2d
854, 857 (Ga. 2010).
99. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-6-612 (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
100. Id. § 24-8-803(5).
101. See Rainey v. Beech Aircraft, 488 U.S. 153, 170 (1988).
102. E.g., Hines v. Brandon Steel Decks, Inc., 886 F.2d 299, 303 (11th Cir. 1989).
103. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-8-803(6) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
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sources of information or other circumstances indicate a lack of
trustworthiness of an investigative report offered under subsection
(C), the court may exclude it.
(13) Necessity Exception Adds a Notice Requirement—The current
Georgia necessity exception is the same as the new one, based on
Federal Rule 807, with one difference. Current Georgia law does not
require pretrial notice of intent to invoke the exception.104 Under the
new rule, a statement may not be admitted:
[U]nless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party,
sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the
adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, the
proponent’s intention to offer the statement and the particulars of
105
it, including the name and address of the declarant.

(14) Refreshing Recollection—Under both current law and the new
rules, counsel can use anything to refresh the recollection of a
witness.106 But Georgia cases are inconsistent on when the opposing
lawyer can demand to see any writing used to refresh a witness’s
recollection, either before or during the witness’s examination. Some
Georgia cases state that the opponent has this right only in criminal,
not civil, cases, though why the two should be treated differently is
never explained.107 Other Georgia cases extend this right to civil, as
well as criminal, cases.108
The new rules end any confusion. In both civil and criminal cases,
opposing counsel has the right to see any writing used to refresh a
witness on the stand, to question the witness regarding the writing,
and to introduce any portions of the writing that “relate to the
testimony of the witness.”109 As for writings shown to a witness to
104. See MILICH, supra note 5, §19:32.
105. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-8-807 (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
106. E.g., United States v. Darden, 70 F.3d 1507, 1540 (8th Cir. 1995); Miller v. State, 561 S.E.2d
810, 814 (Ga. 2002); Green v. State, 249 S.E.2d 1, 5 (Ga. 1978).
107. See, e.g., Schofield v. Meders, 632 S.E.2d 369, 369 (Ga. 2006).
108. E.g., Lester v. S. J. Alexander, Inc., 193 S.E.2d 860, 862 (Ga. Ct. App. 1972); State Highway
Dep’t v. Godfrey, 164 S.E.2d 340, 341 (Ga. Ct. App. 1968).
109. GA. CODE ANN § 24-6-612(a) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
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refresh his recollection before testifying, “if the court in its discretion
determines it is necessary in the interests of justice,” the opposing
party may see the writings, question the witness regarding them, and
introduce any portions of the writing that “relate to the testimony of
the witness.”110
The new Georgia rule also has an additional sentence, not in the
Federal Rule, that codifies current Georgia practice regarding
showing a witness, prior to her testifying, materials that might be
protected under the attorney-client privilege or work product rule. “If
the writing used is protected by the attorney-client privilege or as
attorney work product under Code Section 9-11-26, use of the
writing to refresh recollection prior to the trial shall not constitute a
waiver of that privilege or protection.”111
(15) Authentication Made Easier—The new rules make the
authentication of evidence (documents, things, voices, photos, etc.)
easier in three ways. First, the new rules make explicit the lenient
standard for admissibility: “[E]vidence sufficient to support a finding
that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.”112 This
standard underscores that, ultimately, it is a question for the trier of
fact whether evidence is authentic, and thus, the judge should admit
the evidence if a reasonable fact finder could find it authentic.113
Second, the new rules collect and park in one place all the rules for
authenticating every type of evidence.114 This increased accessibility
will make the resolution of authentication issues quicker and easier.
Finally, the new rules relax some of the requirements for
authenticating certain kinds of evidence. For example, authenticating
phone calls is easier under the new rules.115 Notarized documents are
110. Id. § 24-6-612(b). Current Georgia law, at least in criminal cases, allows opposing counsel to
examine writings used to refresh a witness’s testimony after the trial began. Baxter v. State, 331 S.E.2d
561, 571 (Ga. 1985).
111. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-6-612(b) (effective Jan. 1, 2013) (citation omitted); see, e.g., McKinnon v.
Smock, 445 S.E.2d 526, 528 (Ga. 1994) (upholding work product protection when witness used attorney
materials to prepare testimony before trial).
112. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-901(a) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
113. Id. § 24-10-1008.
114. See id. §§ 24-9-901 to -924.
115. Compare id. § 24-9-901(b)(6), with Tidwell Co. v. Robley Hats, Inc., 186 S.E.2d 489, 494–95
(Ga. Ct. App. 1971).
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self-authenticating under the new rules.116 The rules regarding proof
of chain of custody in criminal cases are unchanged.117
(16) Best Evidence Rule Applies to All Recordings, Not Just
“Writings”—Although the new rules do not use the term “best
evidence,” the substance of the rule remains—a party may not testify
to the contents of a writing or other recording without producing it.118
Georgia’s current best evidence rule is from the Code of 1863 and
applies only to “writings,” not photos, video, or any other
recordings.119 The new rules apply to any form of recorded facts or
data.120
(17) Best Evidence Rule—Copies Presumptively Acceptable—
Under Georgia’s current best evidence rule, a party must either
produce the original of a writing or account for its nonproduction
before the party may use a copy.121 The new rules provide:
A duplicate shall be admissible to the same extent as an original
unless:
(1) A genuine question is raised as to the authenticity of the
original; or
(2) A circumstance exists where it would be unfair to admit
122
the duplicate in lieu of the original.

(18) The Ultimate Issue Rule Abolished . . . Nominally—Current
Georgia law embraces a limited form of the “ultimate issue rule” by
prohibiting lay or expert opinion that mixes law and fact.123 For
example, there is no problem under current Georgia law (or Federal
Rule 704) if an expert testifies in a legal malpractice case that the
defendant failed to use the degree of care and skill expected of an
116. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-902(8) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
117. Compare Hurst v. State, 676 S.E.2d 165, 167 (Ga. 2009), and Johnson v. State, 519 S.E.2d 221,
229–30 (Ga. 1999), with United States v. Jackson, 345 F.3d 59, 65 (2d Cir. 2003).
118. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-10-1002 (effective Jan. 1, 2013); see MILICH, supra note 5, § 8.2.
119. See, e.g., Perkins v. State, 392 S.E.2d 872, 876 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990).
120. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-10-1001 (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
121. See MILICH, supra note 5, § 8.3.
122. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-10-1003 (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
123. Id. § 24-9-65; see Metro Life Ins. Co. v. Saul, 5 S.E.2d 214, 214 (Ga. 1939).
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ordinary lawyer practicing in Georgia.124 The standard of care of
attorneys is beyond the ken of ordinary jurors, and thus, they require
expert assistance in drawing opinions and inferences from the
evidence.125 However, current Georgia law does not allow a witness
to testify in legal terms or state legal conclusions.126
The ultimate issue rule has been a source of more than its fair
share of debate and confusion.127 The new rules adopt Federal Rule
704, which states that evidence “is not objectionable because it
embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.”128
Federal Rule 704 was amended in 1984 to revive the prohibition
against a witness testifying to an ultimate issue of whether an
accused in a criminal case did or did not have a relevant mental
state.129
Although abolished by name, federal courts still will not allow
witnesses to present opinions in legal terms or to invade the province
of the jury by drawing inferences that the jurors are fully capable of
drawing on their own.130 Rather than stating that such opinions
violate the ultimate issue rule, courts exclude them on the grounds
that they are not helpful or will not assist the trier of fact.131
(19) Hypothetical Questions Never Required—The hypothetical
question was required at common law so that the trier of fact could
more clearly understand the factual bases of the expert’s opinion.132
124. See, e.g., Bilt Rite of Augusta, Inc. v. Gardiner, 472 S.E. 2d 709, 710 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996).
125. See, e.g., id.
126. See, e.g., Allen v. Columbus Bank & Trust Co., 534 S.E.2d 917, 924 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000).
127. See MILICH, supra note 5, § 15.1.
128. FED. R. EVID. 704.
129. David P. Leonard, The Federal Rules of Evidence and the Political Process, 22 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 305, 317-18 (1994). This was called the “Hinkley Amendment” because it was motivated by
reaction to experts testifying in the trial of John Hinkley for his attempted assassination of President
Ronald Reagan.
130. See, e.g., Montgomery v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 898 F.2d 1537, 1541 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding
an expert’s testimony that defendant “had a duty to hire tax counsel” should have been excluded);
Shahid v. City of Detroit, 889 F.2d 1543, 1547–48 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding an expert’s testimony that
police officer was negligent was inadmissible).
131. These requirements that opinion testimony be helpful or assist the trier of fact are contained in
Federal Rules 701(b) (lay opinions) and 702 (expert opinions). See FED. R. EVID. 701–02; see also GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 24-7-701 to -702 (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
132. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 64, §16; see Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Saul, 5 S.E.2d 214,
214–15 (Ga. 1939).
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But experience with the requirement in Georgia and elsewhere
showed it was often an unnecessary impediment to the clear
presentation of expert testimony and an unneeded generator of
courtroom quibbling and appeals.133
The new Georgia rules adopt Federal Rule 705, eliminating any
requirement that an expert be questioned by way of hypothetical
questions.134 This reflects the modern view that trial counsels’
competing motives to present a clear, persuasive direct examination
of an expert and a thorough and sifting cross-examination, are
sufficient to ensure that the trier of fact understands the bases and any
limitations of an expert’s testimony.
Counsel still may use hypothetical questions on direct or cross if
counsel desires.135 If a hypothetical question is used, the traditional
rules apply—it must be based upon evidence that has or will be
admitted at trial plus reasonable inferences from that evidence.136
(20) Character Witnesses Used for Impeachment: Reputation and
Opinion Evidence—Current Georgia law limits a character witness
who testifies regarding the credibility of another witness to stating
the reputation of the subject and does not allow opinion testimony.
Georgia courts have criticized this limitation.137 The new rules
expressly allow a qualified witness to testify not only to a person’s
reputation for truthfulness but also to express an opinion concerning
that person’s character for truthfulness.138
133. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 64, §16; see, e.g., Hyles v. Cockrill, 312 S.E.2d 124, 130
(Ga. Ct. App. 1983).
134. An expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give reasons therefore without first
testifying to the underlying facts or data, unless the court requires otherwise. An expert may in
any event be required to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examination.
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-7-705 (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
135. See, e.g., Taylor v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 787 F.2d 1309, 1317 (9th Cir. 1986).
136. See, e.g., Toucet v. Mar. Overseas Corp., 991 F.2d 5, 10 (1st Cir. 1993).
137. See Simpkins v. State, 256 S.E.2d 63, 65 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979) (“[I]t is an evidentiary anomaly
that—in proving general moral character, the law prefers hearsay, rumor, and gossip, to personal
knowledge of the witness.”).
138. The credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of opinion or
reputation, subject to the following limitations:
(1)The evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness; and
(2)Evidence of truthful character shall be admissible only after the character of the witness
for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise.
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-6-608(a) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
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The current Georgia statute on using a character witness to
impeach another witness139 is an unhappy combination of the pre2005 Georgia statute and Federal Rule 608.140 Part of the rule states
that the witness “may refer only to character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness” of the subject.141 Another part of the same statute
states that the witness should be asked about the “general character”
of the subject.142 The new rule is based solely on Federal Rule 608,
and the character witness is limited to testifying regarding the
subject’s character for truthfulness.143
There is no change to the current rule144 that a character witness
may not testify on direct to specific instances of the subject’s conduct
that illustrate the subject’s character for truthfulness. However, in the
discretion of the court, a character witness may be asked on crossexamination if he has heard or knows of specific instances of conduct
that rebut the character witness’s reputation or opinion testimony on
direct.145
Current Georgia rules never allow a cross-examiner to question a
witness about past acts of untruthfulness, unrelated to the case, to
impeach that witness’s credibility.146 The new rule gives the court
discretion to allow such questions.147
(21) Impeachment by Prior Inconsistent Statement—The new rule
relaxes the foundation requirements somewhat. When impeaching a
witness with a prior oral inconsistent statement, the new rule does not
require that counsel draw the witness’s attention to “the time, place,

139. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-84 (2010).
140. See MILICH, supra note 5, § 14.5; see also FED. R. EVID. 608.
141. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-84(1) (2010).
142. Id. § 24-9-84(4).
143. Id. § 24-6-608(a) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
144. Id. § 24-9-84(4).
145. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-6-608(b)(2) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
146. See, e.g., Pruitt v. State, 514 S.E.2d 639, 649 (Ga. 1999).
147. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-6-608(b)(1) (effective Jan. 1, 2013); see, e.g., United States v. Matthews,
168 F.3d 1234,1244 (11th Cir. 1999) (“Rule 608(b) provides that the trial court may in its discretion
permit questioning about a witness’ prior bad acts on cross-examination, if the acts bear on the witness’
character for truthfulness. If the witness denies the conduct, such acts may not be proved by extrinsic
evidence and the questioning party must take the witness’ answer, unless the evidence would be
otherwise admissible as bearing on a material issue of the case.” (citations omitted)).
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person, and circumstances attending the former statement.”148 Nor
must counsel show the witness a prior written inconsistent statement
before asking if the witness made the prior statement.149 The new rule
still requires, however, that the witness be given an opportunity to
explain or deny the prior inconsistent statement before any extrinsic
evidence of the statement is offered into evidence.150
In a departure from the Federal Rules, Georgia’s new rules retain
the holding in Gibbons v. State that a prior inconsistent statement of a
witness is admissible both to impeach the witness and, if the witness
is available for cross-examination, as substantive evidence.151
(22) Sequestration of Witnesses—Georgia’s current statute152
technically only prohibits witnesses from the same side sitting in the
courtroom together, though Georgia courts typically expand the order
to prohibit witnesses from one side remaining in the courtroom while
opposing witnesses testify.153 The new rule orders “witnesses
excluded so that they cannot hear the testimony of other
witnesses.”154
Current Georgia practice discourages, but does not always
prohibit, sequestering a party in a civil case.155 The new rule
prohibits sequestration of a party,156 but the trial court still has
148. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-83 (2010). Compare id., with GA. CODE ANN. § 24-6-613 (effective Jan.
1, 2013). New Georgia Code section 24-6-613 provides:
(a) In examining a witness concerning a prior statement made by the witness, whether written or
not, the statement need not be shown nor its contents disclosed to the witness at that time;
provided, however, upon request the same shall be shown or disclosed to opposing counsel.
(b) Except as provided in Code Section 24-8-806, extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent
statement by a witness shall not be admissible unless the witness is first afforded an opportunity
to explain or deny the prior inconsistent statement and the opposite party is afforded an
opportunity to interrogate the witness on the prior inconsistent statement or the interests of
justice otherwise require. This subsection shall not apply to admissions of a party-opponent as
set forth in paragraph (2) of subsection (d) of Code Section 24-8-801.
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-6-613 (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
149. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-6-613 (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
150. Id. § 24-6-613(b).
151. Gibbons v. State, 286 S.E.2d 717, 721 (Ga. 1982).
152. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-61 (2010).
153. See, e.g., Gray v. State, 476 S.E.2d 12, 16 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996).
154. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-6-615 (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
155. See, e.g., Barber v. Barber, 360 S.E.2d 574, 575 (Ga. 1987).
156. This Code section shall not authorize exclusion of:
(1) A party who is a natural person;
(2) An officer or employee of a party which is not a natural person designated as its
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discretion under new Georgia Code Section 24-6-611(a) to require
that a party testify before other witnesses.157
(23) Jurors May Not Testify in Cases on Which They Serve—
Believe it or not, current Georgia statutes still permit jurors to testify
in a case on which they sit,158 though the practice has been judicially
repudiated.159 The new rules strictly forbid a juror from testifying.160
(B)

Rules Relating to Criminal Trials

(24) Evidence of the Accused’s Good Character—The accused in
a criminal case has the option of presenting evidence of his good
character. Under current Georgia rules, the accused usually is limited
to presenting evidence of his general good character,161 though some
cases have permitted evidence of specific character traits.162 The new
rules clarify that the accused may present evidence of any “pertinent
trait of character,” general or specific.163 For example, although such
general character traits as “law abiding” are always pertinent in a
criminal case, evidence that the accused has a peaceful disposition
would not be pertinent when the accused is charged only with theft.
Likewise, the prosecution’s rebuttal is limited to the particular
character traits presented by the accused.164 If the accused presents
evidence of his reputation for being law abiding, the door is opened

representative by its attorney; or
(3) A person whose presence is shown by a party to be essential to the presentation of the
party’s cause.
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-6-615 (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
157. The court shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses
and presenting evidence so as to:
(1) Make the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth;
(2) Avoid needless consumption of time; and
(3) Protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment.
Id. § 24-6-611(a).
158. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-10-6, 17-9-20 (2010); see Tumlin v. State, 77 S.E.2d 555, 556 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1953).
159. See, e.g., Lively v. State, 421 S.E.2d 528, 529 (Ga. 1992).
160. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-6-606(a) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
161. See, e.g., Brooks v. State, 512 S.E.2d 693, 694 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999).
162. See, e.g., Walker v. State, 449 S.E.2d 845, 847 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994).
163. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-4-404(a)(1) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
164. Id.
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wide for rebuttal.165 But if the accused limits his character evidence
to the trait of honesty, the prosecution can respond only with
evidence rebutting that specific character trait.166 The new rule does
not change existing Georgia law concerning instructing the jury
regarding evidence of the accused’s good character in a criminal
case.167
The new rules clarify that if an accused testifies, he may present,
during his direct examination, specific instances of his conduct that
evidence a pertinent character trait.168 This retains current Georgia
practice.169
There is no change to the rule that, regardless of whether the
accused presents evidence of his good character, if the defendant
testifies to certain material facts on direct, the prosecution may offer
evidence in rebuttal of those facts, even if the rebuttal reflects poorly
on the accused’s character.170
(25) Character Witnesses Concerning the Accused’s Character:
Reputation and Opinion Evidence—Current Georgia law limits a
character witness to the reputation of the subject and does not allow
opinion testimony.171 Georgia courts have criticized this limitation.172
The new rules expressly allow a qualified witness to express an
opinion concerning the defendant’s character.173
There is no change to the current rule that a character witness may
not testify on direct to specific instances of the subject’s conduct that
illustrate the subject’s character,174 but a character witness may be
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. See Kurtz v. State, 652 S.E.2d 858, 861 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007).
168. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-4-405(b) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
169. See, e.g., Harris v. State, 615 S.E.2d 532, 536 (Ga. 2005).
170. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-6-621 (effective Jan. 1, 2013) (“A witness may be impeached by
disproving the facts testified to by the witness.”); Jones v. State, 363 S.E.2d 529, 534 (Ga. 1988).
Current Georgia Code section 24-9-82 was retained and renumbered as new Georgia Code section 24-6621.
171. See Simpkins v. State, 256 S.E.2d 63, 65 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979).
172. See id. (“[I]t is an evidentiary anomaly that in proving general moral character, the law prefers
hearsay, rumor, and gossip to personal knowledge of the witness.”).
173. In all proceedings in which evidence of character or a trait of character of a person is admissible,
proof shall be made by testimony as to reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion.
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-4-405(a) (effective Jan. 1, 2013)
174. See, e.g., Thomas v. State, 655 S.E.2d 599, 601 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008).
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asked on cross-examination if she has heard or knows of specific
instances of conduct that rebut the character witness’s direct
testimony.175
(26) “Similar Transaction Rule” Renovated—Every American
jurisdiction permits prosecution evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or
acts of the accused that are not offered merely to prove the accused’s
bad character or propensity to crime,176 but instead are specifically
relevant to an issue in the case. Georgia’s version of this rule,
misleadingly labeled the “similar transaction” rule,177 has gone
further than most in admitting the accused’s prior crimes or acts to
prove his criminal propensity.178 Georgia is the only jurisdiction that
admits evidence of the accused’s unrelated past crimes and other bad
acts to prove his “bent of mind” or “course of conduct.”179 Georgia
cases do not explain where bent of mind came from or how it
comports with the statutory rule against character evidence.180 Oddly,
the only substantive discussion of bent of mind in Georgia cases is
critical.181
175. On cross-examination, inquiry shall be allowable into relevant specific instances of conduct.
GA. CODE ANN.§ 24-4-405(c) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
176. See Smith v. State, 501 S.E.2d 523, 525 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (“The primary aim of [the
character] rule is to avoid the forbidden inference of propensity. Just because a defendant has committed
wrongful acts in the past is not alone legal grounds to believe he has done so on the occasion under
scrutiny.”).
177. See Barrett v. State, 436 S.E.2d 480, 481 n.2 (Ga. 1993); Young v. State, 642 S.E.2d 806, 808
(Ga. Ct. App. 2007).
178. See MILICH, supra note 5, §§ 11.10, 11.13.
179. See Wade v. State, 670 S.E.2d 864, 867 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008); MILICH, supra note 5, § 11.13.
180. The general character of the parties and especially their conduct in other transactions are
irrelevant matter unless the nature of the action involves such character and renders necessary or
proper the investigation of such conduct.
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-2-2 (effective Jan. 1, 2013); see Nicholson v. State, 186 S.E.2d 287, 289 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1971) (“This is the very purpose of the general rule—to prevent a conviction for a particular crime
based upon a showing of a criminal ‘bent of mind’.”); Shinall v. State, 147 S.E.2d 510, 511 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1966) (“That evidence of other crimes offers an inference of a criminal bent of mind which makes
it easier to believe the defendant has committed the crime for which he is on trial is exactly the reason
for excluding such testimony.”); Story v. State, 98 S.E.2d 42, 45 (Ga. Ct. App. 1957) (“To permit the
introduction of such evidence . . . merely to show ‘bent of mind’; that is to say, to permit the
introduction of such evidence to show that the defendant is more likely to commit again a crime of
which he has previously been guilty is the precise reason for excluding such testimony.”).
181. See, e.g., Farley v. State, 458 S.E.2d 643, 650 (1995) (Sears, J., concurring) (“First, ‘bent of
mind’ and ‘course of conduct’ have evolved into amorphous catch-phrases, difficult to define and
slippery in application. While they may be legitimate purposes for introducing independent crime
evidence under some circumstances, careful analysis of the relevance of the evidence is especially
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The new rules “reboot” the law in this area by adopting Federal
Rule 404(b), which follows the traditional common law approach of
admitting evidence of the accused’s other crimes, wrongs, or acts
when specifically relevant to the necessary proof of “motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence
of mistake or accident.”182 Terms like bent of mind and course of
conduct, which essentially invite admitting the accused’s past crimes
to prove his criminal character, are gone and hopefully forgotten.
The new rules retain the current requirement that the prosecution
provide pretrial notice of its intent to offer “other crimes, wrongs, or
acts” evidence.183 Also retained is the rule dispensing with such
notice when the other crimes, wrongs, or acts evidence is offered to
prove the circumstances surrounding the charged offense, motive, or
prior difficulties between the accused and the victim, when
relevant.184
The similar transaction rule in Georgia “has been most liberally
extended in cases involving sexual offenses.”185 The new rules
continue this policy with the adoption of Federal Rules 413, 414, and
415.186
In DUI cases, the routine use of the bent of mind slogan has
resulted in the nearly automatic admission of the driver defendant’s
important when those purposes are claimed. Such careful scrutiny is essential because a person’s bent of
mind is dangerously close to being his character, and a person’s course of conduct could easily show
nothing more than a mere propensity to act in a certain manner.”); Payne v. State, 674 S.E.2d 298
(2009) (Hunstein, J., dissenting) (“[u]sing phrases like ‘bent of mind’ or ‘course of conduct’ totally
obscures the distinction between legitimate evidence and the prohibited evidence of character”) (quoting
Paul S. Milich, Georgia Rules of Evidence, § 11.13, p. 189-190 (2d. ed. 2002)).
182. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts shall not be admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other
purposes, including, but not limited to, proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. The prosecution in a criminal proceeding
shall provide reasonable notice to the defense in advance of trial, unless pretrial notice is excused
by the court upon good cause shown, of the general nature of any such evidence it intends to
introduce at trial. Notice shall not be required when the evidence of prior crimes, wrongs, or acts
is offered to prove the circumstances immediately surrounding the charged crime, motive, or
prior difficulties between the accused and the alleged victim.
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-4-404(b) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
183. Id.; see also GA. UNIF. SUP. CT. R. 31.3.
184. See GA. CODE ANN. § 24-4-404(b) (effective Jan. 1, 2013); MILICH, supra note 5, § 11.11.
185. Kingsley v. State, 603 S.E.2d 78, 79 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004).
186. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 24-4-413 to -415 (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
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prior DUI offenses,187 despite the fact that the driver’s intent is not an
issue in DUI prosecutions.188 With the loss of the bent of mind
exception upon the adoption of new rules of evidence, prosecutors
were concerned that a defendant’s prior DUIs would be inadmissible
regardless of their specific relevance to an issue in the case.189 New
Georgia Code Section 24-4-417 was added to describe two situations
in which a DUI defendant’s prior DUI would be admissible, as well
as to confirm that a court could admit a prior DUI under section 244-404(b) if it meets the requirements of that section.190
(27) Factual Bases of an Expert’s Opinion in Criminal Trials—
The 2005 tort reform package included a provision adopting versions
of Federal Rules 702 (the Daubert rule) and 703 (bases of expert
testimony).191 Prosecutors opposed any adoption of Daubert in
criminal cases and lawmakers responded by limiting both of
Georgia’s versions of 702 and 703 to civil cases.192 This probably
was inadvertent since 703 has nothing to do with 702 or Daubert.
The two provisions just happened to be in the same proposed code

187. See, e.g., Lowenthal v. State, 593 S.E.2d 726, 729 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004); Fields v. State, 512
S.E.2d 19, 23 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999).
188. See, e.g., Prine v. State, 515 S.E.2d 425, 427 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999).
189. Daniel Hendrix et al., Note, Evidence, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 8 (2010).
190. (a) In a criminal proceeding involving a prosecution for a violation of Code Section 40-6-391,
evidence of the commission of another violation of Code Section 40-6-391 on a different
occasion by the same accused shall be admissible when:
(1) The accused refused in the current case to take the state administered test required by
Code Section 40-5-55 and such evidence is relevant to prove knowledge, plan, or absence of
mistake or accident;
(2) The accused refused in the current case to provide an adequate breath sample for the state
administered test required by Code Section 40-5-55 and such evidence is relevant to prove
knowledge, plan, or absence of mistake or accident; or
(3) The identity of the driver is in dispute in the current case and such evidence is relevant to
prove identity.
(b) In a criminal proceeding in which the state intends to offer evidence under this Code section,
the prosecuting attorney shall disclose such evidence to the accused, including statements of
witnesses or a summary of the substance of any testimony that the prosecuting attorney expects
to offer, at least ten days in advance of trial, unless the time is shortened or pretrial notice is
excused by the judge upon good cause shown.
(c) This Code section shall not be the exclusive means to admit or consider evidence described in
this Code section.
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-4-417 (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
191. SB 3 (SCS), 2005 Ga. Gen. Assem.
192. MILICH, supra note 5, § 15.5, at 435 n.1.
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section.193 The new rules apply Georgia’s version of Federal Rule
703 to criminal, as well as civil, trials.194
The current rules in criminal cases regarding the permissible
factual bases of an expert witness’s opinion are inconsistent and
confusing. Although it is often stated that an expert may rely on some
hearsay in forming her opinion, it is far from clear what quantitative
or qualitative limitations there are on such hearsay and, more
importantly, whether the expert may disclose the otherwise
inadmissible hearsay upon which she relied to the jury.195
Under the new rules, an expert witness may base her opinion on
inadmissible evidence, including hearsay, if the facts are “of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming
opinions or inferences upon the subject.”196 In a jury trial, the
otherwise inadmissible facts upon which the expert relied “shall not
be disclosed to the jury by the proponent of the opinion or inference
unless the court determines that their probative value in assisting the
jury to evaluate the expert’s opinion substantially outweighs their
prejudicial effect.”197 Opposing counsel may inquire into any and all
factual bases of an expert’s opinion.198
There is no change in the basic rule that an expert may not be a
mere conduit for the opinions of other experts not before the court.199
Although an expert may base her opinion, in part, on what she
learned from other experts, the testifying expert must have, and be
able to defend, her own opinion, arrived at independently.200
(28) Admissions by Silence in Criminal Cases—At one time,
Georgia cases liberally admitted anything said in the presence of a
party, including when the party was a criminal suspect and was silent
193. See GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-67.1(a)–(b) (effective Jan. 1, 2013). New Code Section 24-9-67.1(a)
corresponds to Federal Rule 702 and new Code Section 24-9-67.1(b) corresponds to Federal Rule 703.
194. GA. CODE. ANN. § 24-7-703 (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
195. See MILICH, supra note 5, § 15.5.
196. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-7-703 (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
197. Id.
198. Id. § 24-7-705.
199. See, e.g., United States v. Grey Bear, 883 F.2d 1382, 1392–93 (8th Cir. 1989); Horton v.
Hendrix, 662 S.E.2d 227, 234 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008).
200. See, e.g., United States v. Floyd, 281 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2002); Watkins v. State, 676
S.E.2d 196, 200 (Ga. 2009).
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in the presence of the police.201 The Georgia Supreme Court
repudiated this rule in Jarrett v. State,202 and broadly held that “a
witness in a criminal trial may not testify as to a declarant’s
statements based on the acquiescence or silence of the accused.”203
This decision excludes tacit admissions by the accused’s silence even
when there are no police present and the accused was not exercising a
right to remain silent.204 This goes further than most applications of
the Federal Rule,205 which admit a defendant’s silence, not made in
the presence of the police, when “under the circumstances, an
innocent defendant would normally be induced to respond, and
[when] . . . there are sufficient foundational facts from which the jury
could infer that the defendant heard, understood, and acquiesced in
the statement.”206
Georgia’s rule was based on a balancing of probative value against
unfair prejudice under Georgia’s current tacit admission statute.207
Whether Georgia courts will construe new Code Section 24-8801(d)(2)(B)208 the same way as the old Georgia statute or the way
federal courts construe it remains to be seen.
(29) Co-Conspirator Exception Clarified—Georgia’s current
hearsay exception for co-conspirator’s statements comes from the
Code of 1863.209 For well over a half century, this statute was
construed to conform to the common law rule that only statements
made by a conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy were
201. See, e.g., Jarrett v. State, 441 S.E.2d 843 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994), aff’d on other grounds, 453 S.E.2d
461, 463 (Ga. 1995).
202. Jarrett, 453 S.E.2d at 463.
203. Id.
204. See Reynolds v. State, 673 S.E.2d 854, 855 (Ga. 2009).
205. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(B).
206. United States v. Carter, 760 F.2d 1568, 1579 (11th Cir. 1985).
207. Acquiescence or silence, when the circumstances require an answer, a denial, or other conduct,
may amount to an admission.
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-3-36 (effective Jan. 1, 2013); see Reynolds v. State, 673 S.E.2d 854, 855 (Ga.
2009); Mallory v. State, 409 S.E.2d 839, 843 (Ga. 1991).
208. New Code Section 801(d)(2)(B) defines a tacit admission simply as: “A statement of which the
party has manifested an adoption or belief in its truth.” GA. CODE ANN. § 24-8-801(d)(2)(B) (effective
Jan. 1, 2013).
209. After the fact of conspiracy is proved, the declarations by any one of the conspirators during the
pendency of the criminal project shall be admissible against all.
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-3-5 (2010).
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admissible.210 No Georgia cases have expressly dropped the “in
furtherance” requirement, and it still appears in a few cases211 and in
the pattern jury instruction approved by the Georgia Council of
Superior Court Judges.212 Yet there are dozens of reported cases in
which a co-conspirator’s statements were admitted even though there
was no possible sense in which they were in the furtherance of any
conspiracy; indeed, in many of the cases the statements were adverse
to the interests of the conspiracy.213 Yet these cases include no
discussion of that fact, leading to the impression that the in
furtherance requirement for co-conspirator’s statements is forgotten,
if not gone.
The new rule is based on Federal Rule 801(d)(2)(E) and expressly
includes the in furtherance requirement.214 This restores Georgia’s
co-conspirator exception to its original common law form.215 The
new rule adds two sentences to the language of the Federal Rule. The
first clarifies that if the conspirators, after the commission of the
crime, continue to conspire to conceal the crime and the statement is
in furtherance of that conspiracy to conceal, the statement is
admissible under the exception.216 The second clarifies that the
exception is available regardless of whether the accused was charged
with conspiracy.217
Under current Georgia law, the jury ultimately decides whether the
foundation for a co-conspirator statement has been met and is
instructed accordingly.218 The offered statement may not be
210. See MILICH, supra note 5, § 18.11.
211. See, e.g., Castillo v. State, 642 S.E.2d 8, 12 (Ga. 2007).
212. 2 COUNCIL OF SUPERIOR COURT JUDGES OF GA., SUGGESTED PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS §
2.02.40 (3d ed. 2003) [hereinafter PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS].
213. See MILICH, supra note 5, § 18.11 at n. 33 (citing cases).
214. A statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy,
including a statement made during the concealment phase of a conspiracy. A conspiracy need not
be charged in order to make a statement admissible under this subparagraph.
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-8-801(d)(2)(E) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
215. See MILICH, supra note 5, § 18.11.
216. This is consistent with federal cases. See, United States v. Carter, 721 F.2d 1514, 1524–25 (11th
Cir. 1984).
217. This is also consistent with federal cases. See United States v. Maldanado-Rivera, 922 F.2d 934,
962 (2d Cir. 1990).
218. See, e.g., Roberson v. State, 493 S.E.2d 697, 704 (1997); see also PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS,
supra note 212, § 2.02.40.
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considered in making this determination.219 Under the new rules, the
judge alone decides whether, by a preponderance of the evidence, the
foundation exists,220 and the offered statement can be considered,
along with other evidence, in making this determination.221 However,
the offered statement alone is not sufficient to establish the basis for
its admissibility but must be supported by independent evidence.222
(30) Statement Against Interest Hearsay Exception Liberalized—
The current Georgia rule limits the statements against interest
exception to when the declarant is dead.223 The new rule only
requires that the declarant be unavailable as a witness at trial.224
Current Georgia law does not admit statements against penal interest
when offered by the defendant in a criminal case225 and allows the
prosecution to offer such statements only when the declarant is dead
and the statement was not made with a view to pending legal
proceedings.226
The new rule admits statements against penal interest in criminal
cases on equal terms for the prosecution and the defense. As a
condition to using the exception, the proponent (whether the
prosecutor or defense counsel) must show that the statement is
“[s]upported by corroborating circumstances that clearly indicate the
trustworthiness of the statement.”227
(31) Forfeiture Hearsay Exception—The new rules provide a
hearsay exception for statements made by a person who is
“unavailable” to testify at trial and the “statement [is] offered against
a party that has engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was
intended to, and did, procure the unavailability of the declarant as a
witness.”228 Thus, for example, in a domestic violence case where the
219. See PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 212.
220. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-1-104(a) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
221. Id. § 24-8-801(d)(2).
222. Id.
223. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-3-8 (2010).
224. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-8-804 (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
225. See, e.g., Timberlake v. State, 271 S.E.2d 792, 796 (Ga. 1980).
226. Crowder v. State, 227 S.E.2d 230, 239 (Ga. 1976); see MILICH, supra note 5, § 19.29.
227. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-8-804(b)(3)(B) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
228. Id. § 24-8-804(b)(5). A very early Georgia case recognized the common law exception for
forfeiture, but it has not appeared again in Georgia cases for over 150 years. See Williams v. State, 19
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spouse-victim asserts a privilege not to testify and thus becomes
unavailable as a witness at trial, if the prosecution can convince the
trial judge, by a preponderance of the evidence,229 that the defendant
used wrongful means to get the spouse to invoke the privilege, the
court could admit the spouse’s out-of-court statements over a hearsay
objection.230
(32) Application of Rules to Probation Revocation Hearings—
Currently, the exact extent to which the rules of evidence apply to
probation revocation hearings is a bit fuzzy. Currently, hearsay is
inadmissible at a probation revocation hearing,231 and the probationer
is entitled to due process232 and “fundamental fairness.”233 The stakes
at a probation revocation hearing are high enough that the rules of
evidence ought to be clear and consistent from court to court and not
left to the vagueness of generalized fairness requirements.
The new rules expressly state that the rules of evidence apply to
probation revocation hearings.234 There is no change to the standard
of proof at such hearings, which is preponderance of the evidence.235
Nor is there any change to parole revocation hearings, which are
administrative matters handled by the Board of Pardons and Parole.
The rules of evidence traditionally have not been applied in such
proceedings.236
(C)

Rules Relating to Civil Trials

(33) Subsequent Remedial Measure Rule in Product Liability
Cases—Courts and scholars have debated whether the subsequent
Ga. 402, 403 (1856).
229. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-1-104(a) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
230. The court could also admit the statements over a Confrontation Clause objection since forfeiture
applies to that Sixth Amendment right as well. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004); see
also Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 833 (2006).
231. See, e.g., Brown v. State, 668 S.E.2d 490, 493 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008).
232. See Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 611 (1985).
233. Meadows v. Settles, 561 S.E.2d 105, 108–09 (Ga. 2002).
234. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-1-2(b) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
235. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-8-34.1(b) (2010).
236. Williams v. Lawrence, 540 S.E.2d 599, 601–02 (Ga. 2001); see GA. CODE ANN. § 24-1-2(c)(4)
(effective Jan. 1, 2013) (stating the rules of evidence do not apply to “[p]roceedings for revoking
parole”).
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remedial measure rule should apply in product liability cases. In
1997, Federal Rule 407 was amended to clarify that, at least in
federal courts, subsequent remedial measures would not be admitted
in product liability cases.237 Georgia courts, on the other hand, sided
with the view that it is not necessary to exclude evidence of
subsequent remedial measures in product liability cases because
product manufacturers have a host of other incentives to remedy
defects in their products, regardless of whether such efforts might be
used against them in a lawsuit.238 The new rules retain Georgia policy
in this respect and thus depart from the current Federal Rule.239
Georgia’s version of Federal Rule 407 also clarifies that the rule
excludes remedial measures that follow an injury or harm but without
the apparent limitation in the Federal Rule that the remedial measure
must have followed the injury or harm to the plaintiff in the subject
lawsuit.240
(34) Compromise Negotiations and Offers of Settlement—
Although current Georgia law excludes statements made “with a
view to a compromise,”241 the protections afforded by the rule are not
always as reassuring as participants in settlement negotiations would
like. Vague distinctions between offers “to compromise” and offers
“to settle,”242 questions about whether the protection extends to
negotiations over damages where liability is admitted,243 and doubts
about coverage of statements that are collateral to actual offers to

237. FED. R. EVID. 407.
238. John Crane, Inc. v. Jones, 586 S.E.2d 26, 31 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003), aff’d, 604 S.E.2d 822 (Ga.
2004); General Motors Corp. v. Moseley, 447 S.E.2d 302, 310 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994).
239. In civil proceedings, when, after an injury or harm, remedial measures are taken to make such
injury or harm less likely to recur, evidence of the remedial measures shall not be admissible to
prove negligence or culpable conduct but may be admissible to prove product liability under
subsection (b) or (c) of Code Section 51-1-11. The provisions of this Code section shall not
require the exclusion of evidence of remedial measures when offered for impeachment or for
another purpose, including, but not limited to, proving ownership, control, or feasibility of
precautionary measures, if controverted.
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-4-407 (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
240. Id.
241. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-3-37 (2010).
242. See, e.g., Teasley v. Bradley, 35 S.E. 782, 787 (Ga. 1900); Stover v. Candle Corp. of Am., 520
S.E.2d 7, 8 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999).
243. See Pac. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co. v. Beavers, 73 S.E.2d 765, 768–69 (Ga. Ct. App. 1952).
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compromise244 all contribute to a less-than-certain environment for
discussing settlement. The new rule provides broader and more
definitive protection for such discussions. As long as the parties are
engaged in compromise negotiations or mediation, all of their
statements and conduct, as well as the statements of nonparties who
participate in the discussions, are protected from disclosure.245
(35) Payment of Medical and Similar Expenses—At one time in
Georgia, a party’s offer to pay medical or similar expenses was
considered an offer to settle, not an offer to compromise, and thus
was admissible.246 Later Georgia cases softened this rule to provide
that if the trial judge determined that the offer to pay expenses was
made on an impulse of benevolence or sympathy, it should not be
considered an admission of liability.247 The new rule ends any
uncertainties or caveats in this area: “Evidence of furnishing,
offering, or promising to pay medical, hospital, or similar expenses
occasioned by an injury shall not be admissible to prove liability for
the injury.”248
(36) Agent Admission Rule Liberalized—Current Georgia law on
vicarious admissions by agents is burdened by the presence of two
overlapping statutes, one from Title 24 (the Evidence Code)249 and
the other from Title 10 (the Commerce and Trade Code).250 This has
led to confusing and inconsistent applications of the rule.251
Generally, an agent’s or employee’s statements are admissible under

244. See, e.g., Nevitt v. CMD Realty Inv. Fund IV, L.P., 639 S.E.2d 336, 339–40 (Ga. Ct. App.
2006); Bounds v. Coventry Green Homeowners’ Ass’n, 601 S.E.2d 440, 442–43 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004).
245. See, e.g., Blu-J, Inc. v. Kemper C.P.A. Grp., 916 F.2d 637, 642 (11th Cir. 1990).
246. Monson v. Brown, 292 S.E.2d 486, 486 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982).
247. See, e.g., Neubert v. Vigh, 462 S.E.2d 808, 809 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995); White v. Front Page, Inc.,
213 S.E.2d 32, 33 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975).
248. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-4-409 (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
249. Admissions by an agent or attorney-in-fact, during the existence and in pursuance of his agency,
shall be admissible against the principal.
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-3-33 (2010)
250. The agent shall be a competent witness either for or against his principal. His interest shall go to
credit. The declarations of the agent as to the business transacted by him shall not be admissible
against his principal unless they were part of the negotiation constituting the res gestae, or else
the agent is dead.
Id. §10-6-64.
251. See MILICH, supra note 5, § 18.10.

http://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol28/iss2/3

38

Milich: Georgia's New Evidence Code - An Overview

2012]

GEORGIA'S EVIDENCE CODE

417

current Georgia law only if the agent or employee was authorized to
speak on behalf of the principal.252
The new rules clarify and broaden the scope of agency admissions
in contrast to prior Georgia law. New Code Section 24-8801(d)(2)(D) sets forth two simple requirements for an agency or
employee admission: First, the statement was made during the
agency or employment relationship. Second, the subject matter of the
statement concerns a matter the agent or employee would know about
by virtue of his agent or employee duties.253
The new rule does not purport to redefine substantive law
regarding when a principal is legally bound by the actions or words
of his agent but only defines an agency admission for purposes of
clearing a hearsay objection. Thus, even though an employee may not
have been authorized to make the statement in question, the court
may admit it over a hearsay objection if it meets the requirements of
this subsection.254
Under current Georgia law, the jury ultimately decides whether the
foundation for an agency admission is met and is instructed
accordingly.255 The offered statement is not considered in making
this determination.256 Under the new rules, the judge alone decides
whether, by a preponderance of the evidence, the foundation
exists,257 and the offered statement is considered along with other
evidence in making this determination.258 However, the offered

252. Id.; see, e.g., Taylor v. Golden Corral Corp., 567 S.E.2d 109, 111 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002); McDevitt
& Street Co. v. K-C Air Conditioning Serv., Inc., 418 S.E.2d 87, 93–94 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992).
253. A statement by the party’s agent or employee, but not including any agent of the state in a
criminal proceeding, concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment, made
during the existence of the relationship.
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-8-801(d)(2)(D) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
254. See, e.g., Corley v. Burger King, 56 F.3d 709, 709 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that although an
employee was not authorized to speak for his employer, the subject matter of the employee’s statement
as to what he was doing at time of a car accident fell within the scope of his employment and was an
agent admission).
255. See, e.g., Ga. Power Co. v. Busbin, 283 S.E.2d 647, 650–51 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981).
256. McDevitt & Street Co. v. K-C Air Conditioning Serv., Inc., 418 S.E.2d 87, 93–94 (Ga. Ct. App.
1992).
257. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-1-104(a) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
258. Id. § 24-8-801(d)(2).
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statement alone is not sufficient to establish the basis for its
admissibility but must be supported by independent evidence.259
The federal courts have overwhelmingly held that Federal Rule
801(d)(2)(D) does not allow the accused in a criminal trial to offer
the out–of–court statements of police officers or other agents of the
State as agent admissions.260 Likewise, Georgia has never permitted
such statements as admissions of the State. The new rule makes this
explicit.261
(37) Impeaching the Verdict in Civil Cases—Current Georgia law
does not allow a juror to testify in court or by affidavit as to the
internal discussions and deliberations of the jury after the jury has
rendered its verdict and been excused.262 The new rules are to the
same effect. However, the new rules include an exception for when
“extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the
juror’s attention” or “any outside influence was brought to bear upon
any juror.”263 This exception currently is recognized in criminal cases
in Georgia,264 but for inexplicable reasons does not apply in civil
cases.265 The new rule applies to all jury trials, civil or criminal.266
(38) Evidence Rules Do Not Apply to Custody and Dispositional
Hearings in Juvenile Courts—Most cases construe current Georgia
Code Sections 15-11-56(a) and 15-11-65(b) to significantly relax the
rules of evidence, including the hearsay rule, in custody and
dispositional hearings in juvenile court,267 though a few cases have
held otherwise.268 The new rules make it clear that the rules of

259. Id.
260. See, e.g., United States v. Prevatte, 16 F.3d 767, 779 n.9 (7th Cir. 1994).
261. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-8-801(d)(2)(D) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
262. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-10-9, 17-9-41 (2010).
263. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-6-606(b) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
264. See, e.g., Spencer v. State, 398 S.E.2d 179, 184 (Ga. 1990).
265. See, e.g., Newson v. Foster, 581 S.E.2d 666, 668 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003).
266. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-6-606 (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
267. See, e.g., In re J.C., 251 S.E.2d 299, 302 (Ga. 1978); In re M.D., 503 S.E.2d 888, 889 (Ga. Ct.
App.1988).
268. In re A.R., 673 S.E.2d 586, 588 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009); In re K.I.S., 669 S.E.2d 207, 209 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2008).
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evidence do not apply269 and thus, hearsay may be considered “to the
extent of its probative value.”270
IV.

UNFINISHED BUSINESS—A FEW ISSUES TO ADDRESS IN THE
FUTURE

Despite the considerable breadth of this year’s changes to the
evidence rules in Georgia, a few issues remain unresolved and
deserve some future attention. For example, the spousal witness
privilege allows a spouse to refuse to testify in criminal proceedings
involving the other spouse.271 There is an exception for cases in
which a spouse is charged with a crime against a minor.272 Many
states extend that exception to crimes against the spouse, such as
spousal abuse.273 Proponents of extending the exception argue that
the law should make it more difficult for a victim spouse to decline to
testify against the defendant spouse.274 Opponents point out that if
the victim spouse cannot claim the privilege, but nevertheless refuses
to testify, the victim spouse faces a contempt of court charge,
victimizing the victim a second time.275 It is not an easy issue. While
there was debate in the State Bar Committee and legislature about the
pros and cons of extending the exception, the consensus was that the
issue deserved separate discussion and treatment, apart from the
general reform of the evidence code.276
The State Bar proposed updating Georgia’s current “clergy
privilege,” which by its terms applies only to clergy and members of
the Christian and Jewish faiths.277 The proposed changes got lost
269. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-1-2(c)(7) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
270. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 15-11-56(a), 15-11-65(b) (2010).
271. Id. § 24-9-23(a).
272. Id. § 24-9-23(b).
273. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 64, § 84.
274. See e.g., Kenneth J. Lewis, Note, The Marital Crime Exception: Why Georgia’s Marital
Privilege Law Should be Changed, 4 J. MARSHALL L.J. 235, 250–51 (2011).
275. R. Michael Cassidy, Reconsidering Spousal Privileges After Crawford, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 339,
355 (2006).
276. See H.R. 840, 150th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2009), available at
http://www1.legis.ga.gov/legis/2009_10/fulltext/hb840.htm.
277. Every communication made by any person professing religious faith, seeking spiritual comfort,
or seeking counseling to any Protestant minister of the Gospel, any priest of the Roman Catholic
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along the legislative path over debate on how to define “religions.”
The current limitations on the privilege are constitutionally
questionable.278
Current Georgia law requires that certain professionals report
evidence of child abuse, notwithstanding any evidentiary privileges
that otherwise apply.279 What is unclear is whether the professionals
covered by evidentiary privileges—such as psychologists, clinical
social workers, therapists, etc.—are free not only to report the child
abuse but also to testify in subsequent proceedings related to that
report. At least one state with a statute like Georgia’s has held that
allowing the disclosure of privileged information for reporting
purposes does not abrogate the testimonial privilege.280 Florida has
clarified its statute to allow the reporting professional to testify.281
Georgia should decide how it wants to handle this issue and proceed
accordingly.
The State Bar proposed some changes to the rape victim shield
rule, but the legislature decided to leave it alone.282 The effort to
reform Georgia’s rape victim shield rule has become a victim of
political demagoguery,283 which is a shame since there are
faith, any priest of the Greek Orthodox Catholic faith, any Jewish rabbi, or to any Christian or
Jewish minister, by whatever name called, shall be deemed privileged. No such minister, priest,
or rabbi shall disclose any communications made to him by any such person professing religious
faith, seeking spiritual guidance, or seeking counseling, nor shall such minister, priest, or rabbi
be competent or compellable to testify with reference to any such communication in any court.
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-22 (2010). The State Bar proposal would have changed the statute to read:
Every confidential communication made by any person professing religious faith, seeking
spiritual guidance, reconciliation, or counseling to any minister, priest, rabbi, imam, or similar
functionary of a bona fide religious organization, shall be deemed privileged and shall not be
disclosed by the minister, priest, rabbi, imam, or similar functionary of such a bona fide religious
organization.
See supra note 8, at 52.
278. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 64, § 76:2.
279. Suspected child abuse which is required to be reported by any person pursuant to this Code
section shall be reported notwithstanding that the reasonable cause to believe such abuse has
occurred or is occurring is based in whole or in part upon any communication to that person
which is otherwise made privileged or confidential by law.
GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-5(g) (2010).
280. State v. Snell, 714 A.2d 977, 981 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998).
281. FLA. STAT. § 39.204 (2010).
282. Hendrix et al., supra note 189, at 19.
283. See, e.g., Larry Peterson, Barnes, Deal Bash Each Other with Hard-Hitting Ads,
SAVANNAHNOW.COM (Oct. 16, 2010, 3:19 AM), http://savannahnow.com/news/2010-10-16/barnes-
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inconsistencies in judicial construction of the statute that have little to
do with policy but should be resolved simply as a matter of providing
clarity and certainty in the application of the rule.284 Moreover,
Georgia’s current rape victim shield act does not apply to several
kinds of sexual assault cases.285 The proposed State Bar rule would
have applied to all crimes involving sexual assault.286
Finally, Georgia currently applies Daubert and its provisions for
judicial review of the reliability of expert testimony in civil cases but
not in criminal cases.287 On its face, this distinction is puzzling.
Daubert was designed to improve the overall reliability of scientific
and other expert testimony in the courtroom.288 It is unclear why a
state would want that improved reliability only in civil, not criminal,
cases. Particularly in light of recent major studies that raise serious
concerns about the reliability of expert testimony in criminal cases,289
the legislature should look at extending the judicial scrutiny that
Daubert requires to criminal cases.
V.

CONCLUSION

Adoption of new rules of evidence will bring two changes to
Georgia practice. The first, the substantive changes in the law of
evidence, are briefly summarized in this article. The second change is
deal-bash-each-other-hard-hitting-ads-0#.TnTRiuzAyso; Larry Peterson, Barnes, Deal Wrangle over
1980s Domestic Violence Legislat[]ion, SAVANNAHNOW.COM (Oct. 19, 2010, 7:32 AM),
http://savannahnow.com/news/2010-10-19/barnes-deal-wrangle-over-1980s-domestic-violencelegislateion#.TnTV1uzAyso.
284. See MILICH, supra note 5, § 11.6, at 245–48 (discussing impeachment and res gestae).
285. Current Georgia Code Section 24-2-3 does not apply to cases of child molestation, sexual
battery, or statutory rape. See Robinson v. State, 708 S.E.2d 303, 306 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011) (en banc).
286. The State Bar’s proposed rule would have applied to all criminal cases in which a person is
accused of rape, statutory rape, assault with intent to commit rape, sexual battery, child molestation,
incest, or any other sexual offense. See supra note 8, at 42.
287. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-67.1 (2010).
288. See generally Daubert v. Merrel Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993) (summarizing its
holding as follows: “‘General acceptance’ is not a necessary precondition to the admissibility of
scientific evidence under the Federal Rules of Evidence, but the Rules of Evidence . . . do assign to the
trial judge the task of ensuring that an expert’s testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is
relevant to the task at hand. Pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles will satisfy those
demands.”).
289. See e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED
STATES: A PATH FORWARD (2009).
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accessibility. Rules of evidence are only as good as the lawyers and
judges who must recall and apply them quickly and accurately in the
heat of trial. Compared with existing Georgia law, the new rules
provide a clearer, simpler, more comprehensive approach to
evidentiary issues. The new Code states:
The object of all legal investigation is the discovery of truth.
Rules of evidence shall be construed to secure fairness in
administration, eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay, and
promote the growth and development of the law of evidence to
the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly
290
determined.

290. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-1-1 (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
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